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<text> <title> (1970s) Middle East War & Peace </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1970s Highlights </history> <link 07792> <link 07655> <link 07653> <link 07067> <link 00164><link 00199><article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> Middle East War & Peace </hdr> <body> [At the start of the decade, Israel and Egypt were at war across the Suez Canal, the Sinai Peninsula having been occupied by Israel ever since the Six-Day War of 1967. When the fighting was finally halted in 1972, it was hoped that a peace settlement could be worked out. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who succeeded Gamal Abdel Nasser upon the latter's death in 1970, was indeed planning to try for peace with Israel. But to do that he had to have the prestige of a military victory. In October 1973, he won the first battle, and though he lost the war, that was enough.] (October 15, 1973) The sirens began to wail while all Israel was observing Yom Kippur, the holiest and also the quietest day of the Jewish year. By tradition, tens of thousands of servicemen were home or on leave; Israeli Broadcasting had shut down for the day; and just about the only vehicles on the highways were ambulances. As crowds of worshipers emerged from synagogues at the end of the five-hour-long morning services of atonement, they found the streets filled with speeding trucks, buses and Jeeps. The Israeli radio was back on the air. All afternoon its broadcasts of news bulletins and classical music were interrupted by such incongruous phrases as "meat pie," "sea wolf" and "wool string"--military codes calling reservists to duty. By late afternoon, virtually every Israeli--and much of the rest of the world as well--knew that what Defense Minister Moshe Dayan defiantly called "all-out war" had begun again. The fighting erupted when Egyptian troops surged across the Suez Canal and Syrian soldiers struck in the north on the Golan Heights. Both forces swept through Israel's front lines and punched their way into Israeli-held territory under the glare of an afternoon sun. Backed by heavy artillery and strafing jets, they maneuvered with tanks and armored vehicles. Helicopters carried some Arab troops into battle. United Nations observers reported seeing Egyptians crossing into the Sinai Desert at five points along the 103-mile canal front; Syrian troops were spotted moving into Israel over the central section of the Golan Heights cease-fire line by other U.N. teams. The The Syrians were soon stopped, but the Egyptians claimed that within hours they occupied nearly all of the east bank of the canal. (October 22, 1973) At week's end, an estimated 100,000 Syrian troops had fallen back from the Golan Heights but were fighting fiercely, and Egypt had managed to insert up to 100,000 men on the east bank of the Suez Canal. The Arabs were standing and fighting--and already celebrating a victory. The mere fact that they had launched an attack against Israel and then sustained it and inflicted painful damage gave an incalculable lift to the spirit of a people who for decades had been beaten again and again on the battlefield. The whole psychological balance of power in the Middle East and most of what used to be considered political realities had suddenly changed. The attack on Sinai and the Golan Heights was carried out with a finesse and synchronization that not even most Arabs suspected that the Arabs possessed. For one thing, details of the invasion were the best-kept Arab military secret in 25 years; combat commanders were not informed of the upcoming attack until they had need to know. Both Israeli and U.S. intelligence picked up signs of gathering forces, but could not bring themselves to believe that the Arabs were actually going to attack. It was only ten hours before the assault began that Israel finally concluded that the Arabs meant business. (October 29, 1973) As the week began, Egyptian forces held firm in their positions on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, protected from Israeli planes by the umbrella of artillery and missiles. Then the Israelis struck back, in the central sector of the front along the eastern bank. Jets screeched overhead, and the eerie white tracks of ground-to-air missiles marked the bright autumn sky. Hundreds of M-60 Patton tanks moved through the golden dunes and barren hills of the Sinai, throwing up huge rooster tails of swirling sand. The purpose of the dramatic assault quickly became clear. In a surprise push, the Israelis sent a spearhead of tanks and armor across the canal just north of the Bitter Lakes to the western bank. The goal of the task force was to destroy missile and artillery sites in Egypt and harass the supply lines that nourished the Egyptian divisions in the Sinai. The Israelis quickly resupplied the infiltration commando force with tanks, halftracks and artillery, first by barge and later across bridges hastily constructed north of the Great Bitter Lake. By week's end the force of 15,000 men was making headway in a three-pronged assault on the western bank of the canal: northward toward Ismailia, southward toward Port Suez and westward toward Cairo. (November 5, 1973) Within twelve hours after passage, both Egypt and Israel announced their acceptance of the [United Nations] cease-fire; Syria followed suit a day later. But there was evidence that the Israelis at least really wanted the fighting to continue to a decisive conclusion. One reason the peacemakers had a difficult time silencing the guns: worry by both sides about the fate of prisoners. Israel had seized an estimated 1,300 Arabs but had lost a sizable number of its own men as battlefield captives. At week's end the Arabs had given the International Red Cross in Geneva the names of 48 Israelis taken prisoner; Jerusalem insists that the true total is closer to 300. At any rate, soon after the cease-fire was supposed to take effect, Israeli armored forces on the west bank of the canal resumed their ranging forays from Port Suez to Ismailia. The apparent aim was to surround and trap 20,000 Egyptian soldiers of the Third Army. Deprived of help from Cairo, the army would likely become hostages for the speedy return of the missing 300. [A disengagement of forces along the Suez Canal resulted from the first of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's celebrated diplomatic "shuttles."] (January 28, 1974) "You have made history this week," said a smiling Israeli Premier Golda Meir to Henry Kissinger. Five hours later and 600 miles away in Egypt, President Anwar Sadat embraced Kissinger, called him "Brother" and said warmly: "Let us hope that the road we paved is for a lasting peace." The praise and affection were certainly deserved, for Kissinger almost single-handed had worked out an agreement to disengage Israeli and Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal. Under the terms of the settlement, Israel agreed to pull back forces that have been in the Sinai for seven years. At the same time, Egypt, whose army moved across the canal during the October war, agreed to thin out its forces. Kissinger's principal advantage in last week's negotiations was his dizzying, diplomatic milk run aboard Air Force Two, his blue and white 707 jet, between Jerusalem and the village of Aswan on the upper Nile, where Sadat was recovering from a bad case of bronchitis. Kissinger made three trips between Sadat and Meir in Jerusalem--who was also ailing, with a painful case of shingles--before he was able to reach an agreement. But by week's end, in a dramatic demonstration of his achievement, he had only to make one final flight between Jerusalem and Aswan to get the signatures of both Meir and Sadat on a document spelling out the most important issues on which both sides agreed. [A far more difficult achievement was the May 1974 cease-fire between Israel and Syria, also worked out through arduous shuttle diplomacy.] (June 10, 1974) Groping for nonmilitary words that would truly express the emotion of the moment, General Ensio Siilasvuo, the commander of the United Nations peace-keeping forces told them that they were taking "a giant and courageous step" that heralded "a new era of trust, justice and peace in the Middle East." With that, Siilasvuo invited representatives of Israel and Syria to sign the disengagement agreement between their countries that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had successfully negotiated during a month of difficult and dramatic shuttle diplomacy. The ceremony did indeed symbolize a giant step. As Siilasvuo reminded the signatories and the U.S., Soviet and Egyptian delegations accompanying them, "a good deal more remains to be done." But remarkable achievements had already been scored--first an Egyptian-Israeli disengagement, next a more complicated Syrian-Israel pullback. The two agreements, limited though they were, made it possible for the first time in years to envision a lasting peace settlement in the Middle East. Both represented extraordinary accomplishments for Kissinger himself, who had once more demonstrated the effectiveness of his unique brand of personal diplomacy. The words of Kissinger's remarkable disengagement deal between Israel and Syria were quickly translated into heartening action last week. On the Golan Heights, where 1,200 artillery duels have been waged since the end of the October war, the big guns fell silent. [Finally in September 1975, an agreement between Israel and Egypt, on the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian control by phased withdrawals, was signed at a stiff, silent ceremony in Geneva.] (September 15, 1975) Almost two years since they last week to war and in a grim, uneasy and almost anticlimactic milepost of history, Israel and Egypt formally accepted what U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described as "the most sweeping document since Israel was made a state, a gigantic political agreement." If that was hyperbole, Kissinger could easily be forgiven. He had fathered the agreement and had cajoled, nudged and pressured both sides into accepting it. The Israelis were particularly resentful of that pressure and during the negotiations there was a coolness between them and the Americans that did not exist before. Beneath the veneer of friendship was a keen sense of hurt on the part of the Israelis. The Israelis agreed to move their troops out of the Mitla and Giddi passes in Sinai and also turn back to Egypt the Abu Rudeis oilfields captured during the Six-Day War. Egypt agreed in writing to let Israeli nonmilitary cargoes pass through the Suez Canal. Both sides agreed that the Middle East conflict should not be resolved by force and that neither side should "resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade." That fell short of the formal promise of nonbelligerency that Jerusalem demanded of Cairo, but the statement was the closest thing to a declaration of peaceful intentions toward Israel made by an Arab nation since the 1948 Armistice. The Geneva accord, which will remain in force for the next three years, was unquestionably an American diplomatic triumph; but it involved an unprecedented American commitment to help maintain peace in the Middle East. The most widely debated proviso of the agreement is an article stipulating that the U.S. will send up to 200 civilian electronics experts to maintain surveillance stations in Sinai that will monitor troop and aircraft movements and report truce violations. Israel refused to ratify the pact without U.S. surveillance. Although not explicitly part of the deal, $2.3 billion in military aid for Israel in fiscal '76, as well as $700 million for Egypt, will now be presented for congressional approval by the Ford Administration. The U.S. will also guarantee oil for Israel to replace supplies previously provided by Abu Rudeis. [By 1977, neither Kissinger nor his successor, Cyrus Vance, had been able to advance the Middle East peace process beyond military arrangements. Then Egypt's Sadat, hoping to persuade Israel to drop all pre-conditions and come to a renewed peace conference, made an astonishing gesture.] (November 28, 1977) At two minutes to 8 on Saturday night--the evening arrival was carefully chosen so as not to violate the Jewish Sabbath--the Egyptian white Boeing 707, its red trim glistening under klieg lights, rolled to a stop at Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport. Israeli army trumpeters blared out a welcoming fanfare. As thousands of Israelis waved their newly purchased red-white-and- black Egyptian flags, out stepped President Anwar Sadat on a "sacred mission"--to speak directly to the people of Israel about peace. At 4 in the afternoon, Sadat mounted the rostrum of the Knesset to deliver--in Arabic--a 57-minute speech notable for its rhetorical passion. He had come to the Knesset, the President said, not to sign a peace treaty but to break down the "barrier of suspicion, fear, illusion and misinterpretation" that for so long has prevented the two neighbors from even talking about peace. In the strongest acknowledgement ever made by an Arab leader of Israel's right to exist, Sadat said, "You want to live with us in this part of the world. We welcome you in sincerity." He admitted that the Arab states had rejected Israel in the past, refusing to meet its representatives. "Yet today we agree to live with you," he said. "Israel has become a fait accompli recognized by the whole world. In an emotional conclusion directed to "the people Israel," Sadat besought them to "teach your children that what has passed is the end of suffering and what will come is a new life." Said former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, an Arab linguist, when Sadat had finished: "The speech itself was predictable. I could have written it myself. But the Middle East can never be the same again." [Sadat's journey for peace created a new atmosphere, but the peace talks bogged down, in considerable part because of the intransigence of Israel and Prime Minister Begin. Then President Carter summoned the two leaders to a summit at Camp David, the U.S. Presidential retreat, to thrash out their differences in isolation and arrive at a formula for peace.] (September 25, 1978) After 13 days of being cloistered with their closest aides at Camp David, President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Premier Menachem Begin emerged Sunday night to sign before the television cameras and the watching world two documents that were giant efforts toward peace in the Middle East. Though considerable obstacles and hard bargaining remain, it was a major breakthrough in areas that have defied all the efforts of war and diplomacy for three decades. The first document was titled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East." As ambitious as its name, it envisaged in great detail the mechanics, if not all the solutions, that would enable Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians to work out over five years the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, a measure of autonomy for the Palestinians in those regions, and gilt-edged guarantees of security for Israel. The second document was "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel." Except on one critical point left unresolved, the status of Israeli settlements in the occupied Sinai, it was even more precise and explicit. It called for an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty to be signed within three months, major Israeli withdrawals within three to nine months after that, the normalization of all relationships between the two countries within a year and complete Israel withdrawal from Egyptian territory within three years. The magnitude of their triumph was evident as the three leaders spoke in turn Sunday night in the gold and crystal East Room of the White House where some 400 Congressmen, Cabinet members and the trio's staff had hastily assembled. His face ashen with fatigue but punctuated by repeated smiles, Carter announced the broad outlines of the two agreements, declaring, "My hope is that the promise of this moment will be fulfilled." Sadat, initially somber, was almost reverential in his praise of Carter for calling the summit. Said he: "You took a gigantic step." Begin, chatty at first, turned serious to sound the same note of praise. "It was really the Jimmy Carter conference...the President of the U.S. won the day," he said. "Peace now celebrates a great victory for the nations of Egypt and Israel and for all mankind." Finished, Begin rose to embrace Carter. Then, in an emotional piece of theater as telling as anything the three men had said, Begin walked behind Carter to Sadat and the two men embraced, not once but twice. Not since Sadat had stepped from his plane into the klieg lights at Tel Aviv airport ten months ago had peace in the Middle East seemed so palpably possible. [The negotiations threatened to come apart over those Sinai settlements, and the Camp David accords verged on failure. Seizing the initiative, President Carter embarked on his own Middle East shuttle in order to salvage them.] (March 26, 1979) The gesture was eloquent. Emerging from the doorway of Air Force One on the floodlit tarmac at Andrews Air Force Base last week, an exhausted Jimmy Carter greeted several thousand welcomers by flinging open his arms. It was a movement that oddly combined a sense of triumph with just a hint of martyrdom. Said Carter: "I believe that God has answered our prayers." He had taken a tremendous risk and had won. At times during his six-day mission to Cairo and Jerusalem in an attempt to forge an Egyptian-Israeli peace, failure seemed all but certain. Discouraged aides talked openly of the trip becoming "a debacle." But at the last minute Carter achieved a victory of presidential diplomacy that has brought Egypt and Israel to the threshold of peace after 30 years of enmity and four brutal wars. By his daring and persistent personal intervention, Carter fundamentally altered the geopolitical equation in the volatile Middle East. He also strengthened his own standing both at home and overseas. Carter's achievement will probably help him most in silencing those who accuse him of reckless leadership. What worries some politicians, however, is the potentially enormous tab that the U.S. may have to pick up as its part of the peace treaty. It may be painful for the White House to ask for billions in economic and military aid for Egypt and Israel at a time when domestic programs are being trimmed. To any such difficulty, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd answered: "Whatever the price, the cost of peace must be weighed against the cost of war." [The treaty was signed by all three men in Washington in March 1979. Since then, however, the peace process has not moved beyond the two nations' cool, bilateral relationship.] </body> </article> </text>